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Gilbert B. Kaplan*
The Use of Arbitration to Resolve
Market Access Disputes
Japanese Prime Minister Noburu Takeshita recently proposed a bi-
national dispute settlement mechanism for resolving trade disputes
between the United States and Japan ("Takeshita proposal" or "propo-
sal"). Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno first raised the proposal in
a meeting with Secretary of State James Baker on February 2, 1989.
The Takeshita idea was not presented as a formal proposal, but
appears to have been more of a trial balloon launched to test the United
States' reaction. Although details are sketchy, the proposal reportedly
called for a Cabinet-level mechanism to settle trade and economic dis-
putes and to coordinate policy between the two countries. The proposal
also included a provision for the formation of a working-level group
comprised of sub-cabinet officials and industry representatives which
would hear trade and economic complaints prior to the higher level
group. The proposal suggested that these bilateral panels review a vari-
ety of issues, including trade disputes, market access problems,
exchange rate policy, macroeconomic issues, development assistance,
and technology transfer. The Takeshita proposal, though purportedly
modeled after the dispute settlement mechanism in the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement("FTA"), in fact differs significantly from
it. The dispute panel would not have "supranational" authority, as do
the FTA dispute settlement panels, nor would its decisions be binding.
Because the Takeshita proposal was informal, the United States did
not make an "official" response. During their meeting, Secretary Baker
informed Minister Uno that the United States would review the propo-
sal, but that the United States believes adequate mechanisms already
exist to handle trade disputes. Privately, United States Government offi-
cials state that the proposal received a negative reaction at the Office of
the United States Trade Representative and the Department of Com-
merce. These offices reportedly viewed the plan as an attempt by the
Japanese to circumvent United States trade laws.
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It is true that there are existing forums for discussing and resolving
United States-Japan trade concerns; a new, elaborate dispute settlement
panel could prove counterproductive. In certain circumstances, it could
even hinder application of both United States and Japanese laws con-
cerning trade issues. However, there is one circumstance in which the
idea could prove quite useful. Certain market access disputes between
the two countries have proven to be particularly intractable. A bi-
national arbitration panel charged with determining the facts underlying
the dispute and with reaching a decision regarding whether either side is
being unfair, could be quite useful.
The United States should respond to the Takeshita suggestion for a
new dispute settlement mechanism by proposing that an arbitration
panel be established which would have jurisdiction and authority to
decide certain market access disputes.
I. A Joint United States-Japan Arbitration Commission to Resolve
Market Access Disputes
Many of the practices which create barriers to market access are already
covered by bilateral and/or multilateral agreements. These practices
include restrictive tariffs, quotas, investment barriers, subsidies, and dis-
criminatory health and safety standards. However, many barriers to
market access stem from less tangible practices ingrained in the business
cultures of economies. There is currently no adequate method for
resolving such market access problems between the United States and
Japan. In some instances there seems to be an agreement by the two
sides that steps need to be taken to increase United States sales in Japan,
but individual United States companies seeking to sell in Japan simply
make no progress. In these circumstances American companies often
present specific complaints to the United States Government. The
United States Government relays these complaints to the Japanese Gov-
ernment, which relays its companies' complaints about the United States
companies' efforts. In short, there is no way for either government to
resolve these kinds of issues. In these circumstances, it may be useful to
have arbitrators look at the evidence on each side and make a determi-
nation as to whether or not there is unfair treatment of potential United
States sellers.
A. The Standards and Law in Market Access Disputes
There is no clear jurisprudence regarding market access in international
law. To some extent, then, these arbitration panels would be working in
uncharted territory. However, in many other areas of trade relations
between the United States and Japan, as well as between other trading
nations, there are clear, agreed upon definitions of what constitutes an
unfair trade practice. For example, there is broad international consen-
sus concerning dumping and subsidization, reflected in the GATT codes
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covering these practices.' Similarly, at least among developed nations,
there are broad areas of agreement as to what constitutes violation of
intellectual property rights. 2 In many instances market access problems
are a symptom of deeper disjunctures between two countries or two
economies. However, in certain circumstances, particularly where there
is some acknowledgement on both sides that non-tariff barriers and
structural differences between the two economies create market access
difficulties, criteria might be established.
What should the standards be? Quite simply, they should not sig-
nificantly differ from the standards used in government procurement or
other competitive acquisition situations. For example, if a product
meets specifications, if its price is competitive, and if the other incidents
to the product, such as service contracts and warranty, are competitive,
it should be expected that the product will be purchased. No basis for
radically different market shares for a foreign product should exist
either in Japan or in the United States. Government hiring provides
another example. There, a careful demarcation of specifications and an
independent review board determine whether candidates meet hiring
qualifications.
Over time the arbitration panels could hopefully develop standards
as to what constitutes true "market access," and true fairness between
foreign sellers and domestic buyers of goods. Furthermore, these stan-
dards might eventually serve as points of departure for multilateral dis-
cussions of a "Market Access Code," similar to the other GATT codes.
B. Arbitration Procedures
An arbitration system to resolve market access disputes should be tried
on a pilot project basis for the next two years. Such an arbitration panel
would not work in all instances. Clearly, governments would not submit
a matter as complex and emotionally charged as the current debate
regarding the development of the FSX fighter plane to independent
arbitrators, nor should they. However, such a mechanism could resolve
many more mundane market access disputes. For example, many of the
day-to-day problems stemming from the semiconductor agreement,3 or
concerning sales of brake pads to auto companies, diagnostic machines
to hospitals, or pigment to paint producers would be amenable to this
sort of solution.
Details of the arbitration procedure would not be difficult to work
out. The United States andJapan could establish an arbitration commis-
1. See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (Geneva 1979); and Agreement on Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Geneva 1979).
2. See Intellectual Properly Talks MovhgAhead, 5 IN'L TRADE REP. (B.N.A.) No. 48,
at 1589 (Dec. 2, 1988).
3. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Arrangement between the Govern-
ment of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning
Trade in Semiconductors (Washington, D.C., Sept. 2, 1986).
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sion. Each nation would choose a roster of, for example, ten to twenty
non-governmental individuals who could serve as arbitrators. In the
event of a market access dispute, the two sides could elect to submit the
dispute to arbitration for resolution. The parties to the case should be
the private potential seller and potential buyer, not the governments.
The arbitrators would have a relatively short time, say six months, to
review evidence, hear arguments, and reach a decision. The decisions
would be binding on the parties, and if the arbitration panel found mar-
ket access discrimination, the party in violation, in what admittedly
would be a rather novel remedy, would be required to increase its
purchases from the aggrieved party.
C. The United States Experience With the Semi-Conductor
Agreement-An Illustration of the Need for an
Arbitration Panel
The United States-Japan Agreement on trade in semiconductors rather
starkly presents the difference between concepts of unfair trade in the
dumping area and in the area of market access. The provisions of the
agreement designed to eliminate dumping contained clear directives
and clear standards. As a result, Japanese producers have stopped
dumping semiconductors in the United States. Regardless of the con-
troversy this may have occasioned, there is no question that this part of
the agreement has met its envisioned goals.
The market access portion of the agreement, however, has not
worked well. In part, this is because there is simply no clear jurisprudence
or standard as to what constitutes "market access" and no clear method
of enforcement. This is a problem not only with respect to semiconduc-
tors, but in many areas of United States-Japan trade, and in the trading
relationships between other countries, as well.
As previously noted, the idea for this system of resolution derives,
in part, from the problems in the market access provisions of the semi-
conductor agreement. In that instance, many American semiconductor
companies approached the U.S. Government complaining of market
access problems in the Japanese market. They argued that their prod-
ucts were comparable in quality, competitive in price, and should there-
fore be purchased by certain buyers, but that they were the victims of
"discrimination." Japanese companies responded to the Japanese Gov-
ernment that the U.S. sellers' products were simply not competitive for
one reason or another. There was simply no way for the governments to
resolve these issues. A review of the contentions by independent fact
finders might have helped to uncover the underlying causes, and to
reach a resolution to this dispute.
D. Possible Objections to an Arbitration Panel
Admittedly, this type of arbitration panel would be a move toward
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increased government involvement, or, at least, outside involvement4 in
the market process. This does not seem a particularly large price to pay
for a solution to a series of intractable market access disputes.
A further objection that might arise to this system is that it is impos-
sible to force a buyer to purchase from a supplier with whom he does
not wish to deal. To some extent this is true, but there are ample prece-
dents for this kind of system. For example, (i) under government pro-
curement law, if the government fails to accept the most competitive
bid, a court or appeal board can require the government to accept such
a bid; (ii) in certain limited circumstances under labor law, if manage-
ment declines to act in good faith, it can be required to enter into a
contract with a labor union; (iii) under antitrust law, if a party wrongfully
terminates a dealer, a court can order the reinstatement of that dealer,
or require the payment of damages (under the described market access
arbitration procedure, presumably the arbitrators could, under some
circumstances, require the payment of damages); (iv) under housing and
employment discrimination law, discriminating parties can be required
to rent to certain tenants or hire certain employees in the event discrimi-
nation is shown.5 These remedies, available in other areas of law, could
be applied to the market access problem.
If the United States and Japan adopted this system, they perhaps
could set an affirmative example that over time could be adopted by the
GATT as a whole, rather than leading the developed nations in the
number and acrimony of trade disputes.
H. Further Steps to Improve the Overall U.S.-Japan Trade Relationship
This Article does not suggest that this arbitration panel would work to
solve all market access trade disputes. Many cases exist where this kind
of private, mandatory dispute settlement will not be appropriate, either
because the reasons for a particular market access problem are too com-
plex, or because an issue is simply too large and politically charged.
Moreover, both parties must pursue different paths in resolving the
overall trade problem. These include first, the use of market share
targets in some U.S.-Japan negotiations. There are areas where such
targets could be useful to both sides. Nevertheless, the United States
and Japan should use this method sparingly. It has significant costs in
terms of the long-term trade relationship between the two countries.
Second, the United States should intensify its trade efforts with
respect to Japan and elsewhere. The trade negotiating sections of the
U.S. Government are continually understaffed and less experienced than
4. "Outside involvement" assuming that the arbitration panel, to some extent,
acted independently of the governments.
5. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5(g); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 634 F.2d
1273, 1284 (10th Cir., 1980) (proper remedy in "failure to hire" case is instatement
in next available position); H.J. Heinz v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514 (1941); Procter &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 953 (1980) (failure to execute a prior agreement).
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their counterparts. Once again, the semiconductor agreement provides
a good example. The United States Government assigned a staff of over
fifteen full time members to the successfully implemented dumping side
of the agreement. Conversely, the U.S. Government did not assign a
single full time person to monitor compliance with the market access
portion of the agreement. 6 In its discussions concerning market access,
the United States Government did not possess the detailed information
necessary to make its case, nor did it retain a staff with the ability to
negotiate painstakingly for weeks in solving problems that arose. For
this reason, in part, the market access portion of the Agreement contin-
ues to falter. The United States must increase its trade negotiating
capability by increasing its resources and expertise in this area.
Third, there was probably not a single participant at the Cornell
Symposium who did not believe that macroeconomic efforts by the
United States would accomplish more with respect to trade problems
than any other single initiative. Specifically, a major reduction in the
United States budget deficit would have a profound impact on United
States trade and competitiveness by lowering interest rates and the cost
of capital for United States manufacturers and by increasing the rate of
savings in the United States. Similarly, responsible budget policy could,
over time, lead to a further reduction in taxes, which would generally
stimulate economic activity in the United States.
Fourth, the United States must make more readily available to its
exporters export financing equivalent to that used by competitors in
other countries. United States manufacturers should not lose sales
because foreign manufacturers can provide better financing terms to a
buyer. Manufacturers consistently convey to the U.S. Government that
this is the reason for many lost sales. Export financing vehicles, pro-
vided either by the government or through private institutions, need to
be dramatically improved in the United States.
Finally, United States business must generally intensify its export
efforts. I recently was in Japan delivering several speeches to the Japan
Fair Trade Center, ajapanese organization that studies trade problems.
The active participants at the organization were generally mid-level
managers from major Japanese corporations. At the conclusion of one
of my speeches, a young woman asked a question. First, she stated that
she would ask her question in English because it was quite complicated
and she doubted that it could be translated accurately (it would be rare
for a United States mid-level manager to ask a question to a Japanese
speaker in Japanese). She then told me that she and others had formed
6. This dichotomy in staffing resulted from the fact that the dumping side of the
agreement was enforced in Import Administration in the Department of Commerce,
while the market access portion of the agreement was largely the responsibility of the
United States Trade Representative's Office. Import Administration in the Depart-
ment of Commerce, for a variety of historical reasons, is a large organization of close
to 300 people which has the resources to quickly put new people on important new
projects. Historically, the United Trade Representative's Office has not had this kind
of resources at its disposal.
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a "study group" to analyze the "anticircumvention" provisions of the
1988 United States Trade Act. These anticircumvention provisions are
an extremely complicated part of the Trade Act, which concern how
country of origin and definition of product will be established under the
United States antidumping and countervailing duty laws. She posed a
number of hypothetical situations and asked how these hypotheticals
would be handled under the new law.
Frankly, I was amazed, not so much by her questions but at what her
questions implied. The fact that there is a group of mid-level Japanese
managers devoted to a study of United States anticircumvention legisla-
tion in the 1988 Trade Act is truly astounding. There are probably not
ten trade lawyers in the United States who are fully familiar with this
section, and certainly no mid-level managers. It is even clearer that
there are very few mid-level managers in the United States who are
familiar withJapanese customs and trade law, or who have a study group
devoted to learning about it. Because I was one of the drafters of the
United States anticircumvention legislation, I can say with certainty that
the issues the woman raised had not been considered in the course of
preparing the statute. The point is that the Japanese approach export-
ing with an unbelievable intensity of effort. This is an admirable quality,
and certainly is a large part of the Japanese success in exporting. United
States companies must duplicate this type of intensity of effort if they are
to be successful. However, United States business cannot be expected
to succeed alone. Their success will depend, to some extent, on the U.S.
Government's leadership and trade negotiating strength. This intensifi-
cation of efforts will be a necessary part of any successful United States
exporting drive.
Conclusion
Along with a variety of other steps, the United States and Japan should
consider the formation of arbitration panels to solve certain market
access disputes. Disputes which may be amenable to such a solution are
those in which the two sides basically agree that there are market access
problems caused by structural or cultural differences between the two
countries, and that neutral fact-finding can serve a purpose. Concepts
and standards established through this arbitration process might be use-
ful more generally in resolving market access problems between the two
countries, and perhaps in multilateral contexts.

